

Attachment to Item #368

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27 March 1961

LATIN AMERICAN REACTION TO PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S SPEECH

Latin American reaction to President Kennedy's 13 March speech proposing a ten-year Alliance for Progress in the Western Hemisphere has been outstandingly good. On 29 March, former president Jose Figueres of Costa Rica issued, in the name of fourteen Latin American political parties, a manifesto, called "the Declaration of San Jose." This manifesto stated: "the Latin American democratic parties applauded the new US attitude toward Latin America, which is worthy of the US revolution and our own political struggles.... It is a reaffirmation. The parties signing this manifesto appeal to all Latin Americans to accept the friendly hand proffered us in a befittingly constructive spirit."

One of the striking aspects of the press reaction is that favorable, even rhapsodic, reaction has come from papers usually highly critical of US policy in Latin America. Some excerpts are given below, which, together with the "Declaration of San Jose," may be used as appropriate.

El Popular (leftist, anti-US and often Communist-line daily in Mexico City) said: "For the first time in history our neighbor government is really interested in developing, with the Latin American nations, an efficient plan of action."

La Prensa (moderately liberal, one of the three largest dailies in Mexico City) said: "What is extraordinary... is that it (the Kennedy speech) clearly states that it does not accept and rejects as friends or allies the privileged and the feudal-minded castes in Latin America."

La Republica (leftist, liberal and occasionally anti-US daily of San Jose, Costa Rica) stated: "the speech... confirms that the enthusiasm of the most enlightened and informed personalities, press and institutions of Latin America for his election and first statements as President were neither premature nor unfounded.... Latin America must rejoice that the people of the United States have chosen a man of such wide vision and such profound social feelings as John F. Kennedy to guide their destinies for these four years."

El Tiempo (liberal, largest and most influential daily in Bogota, Colombia) said: "We must first hail... the lofty ideas and sincerity of his purpose, and, something new in the language to which US statesmen has accustomed us: a clear understanding of the nature and scope of Latin American problems."

El Mundo (leftist-liberal, nationalistic daily in Caracas, Venezuela) commented: "John F. Kennedy is determined to go down in history as the creator of a hemispheric order that will, of itself, link the two Americas solidly forever."

Ultimas Noticias (leftist, frequently critical of US, daily of Caracas, Venezuela) wrote: "Kennedy has spoken with greater understanding of the reality of Latin America than any previous U.S. Chief of State, including Franklin D. Roosevelt."

El Comercio (independent, moderately liberal daily of Quito, Ecuador) said: "(the new U.S. attitude) is revolutionary and realistic.... an historic step of imponderable significance for the future."

La Nacion (leftist daily of Guayaquil, Ecuador) wrote: "The Kennedy plan is a move back to the true good neighbor policies of Roosevelt."

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El Diario (independent, most influential daily in La Paz, Bolivia) said: "It must be recognized that the President is the best defender that Latin America has today and we will have to have faith in him."

Accion (leftist, frequently anti-US daily in Montevideo) wrote: "The Kennedy plan... is a great step forward in the improvement of continental relations; it is a gesture of pure, honest friendship and as such we must recognize and hail it."

Ultima Hora (leftist, frequently anti-US daily in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil) ran a banner headline: "Kennedy issues decalogue to free Latin America from misery in ten years."

La Prensa (largest paper in Buenos Aires, Argentina) called the speech evidence of "American unity and responsibility to face this period in history."

In addition to the "Declaration of San Jose," mentioned above, statements of other groups and individual leaders in the area may be noted.

President Frondizi of Argentina stated: "President Kennedy's new program responds to the needs of Latin America."

Victor Haedo, leader of the governing party and present president of Uruguay' National Council of Government, said: "Uruguay receives this speech and its program of immediate action with faith and hope and will cooperate firmly in the plan expounded by the President of the United States."

Cesar Batlle, Uruguay's minority party leader, stated, "without prejudice to my complete agreement with President Kennedy's objectives, it is unfair not to recognize that the US has always rendered great service to Latin America."

In Chile, the Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs, Fernando Donoso, voiced the official acknowledgement: "The allusions to the policy of President Alessandri in connection with arms limitation made by the President of the United States was very flattering to Chileans."

The Radical Party, leading opposition group, noted in an official statement "the identity of the objectives of US policy with those of the Radical Party, economic development, agrarian reform, tax reform, extension and improvement of education, and a policy of fair prices for raw materials."

President Lleras, of Colombia, said: "You, Mr. President, have a clear and profound conception of what the relationship must be between the countries of this hemisphere. The cooperation you suggest has been the desire of Latin America for many years."

President Prado, of Peru, pledged Peru's cooperation in the "common struggle against misery, injustice and despotism."

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PHILOSOPHY OF MAN (5)

ON MORAL RESPONSIBILITY

[Following is a translation of an article by Adam Schaff in the Polish-language periodical Przegląd Kulturalny (Cultural Review). Vol. X, No. 13 (448), Warsaw, 30 March 1961, page 7. Refer to JPRS: 8000 for parts 1 and 2, and JPRS: 8087 for parts 3 and 4.]

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When retrospectively appraising the past few years, one may state without fear of error that moral responsibility constituted the problem which aroused the lion's share of interest in philosophy, nourished by the broad circles of our intelligentsia, and of our young intelligentsia in particular. This problem was also the chief culprit of the "explosion" of existentialist influences in our philosophical spheres, whose climate was theretofore traditionally shaped up by trends of common sense, and indeed of positivism. For by a thousand threads, the problem of responsibility is connected with those concerning the human individual's status and fate.

The problems of responsibility broke through to philosophy coming from life, from political practice. This was the source of their weight, and of their strength. They were not imaginary, abstract ones. On the contrary, they breathed life, and expressed its conflicts and difficulties which craved philosophical interpretation and generalization. This was even more true when applied to a social sphere trapped in such conflicts, and living them the hard way. It is not by mere chance that the circles connected with neo-positivism, including their younger generations, did not feel the need for "going existentialist," and that they continue being cool, if not hostile to existentialism. But the Marxist intelligentsia, and its young generation in particular accepted existentialist problems as if they were a revelation. Unfortunately, this was often accompanied by the acceptance of the existentialists' subjectivistic solutions. However, one must beware of the easy way out, of a total denial of the existence of such problems, that is. For, in this case, the problems stem from the experience of people who viewed the political difficulties of the past years at an angle of moral responsibility for their own acts, or for the approval granted those of third parties. These problems have to be answered, and answered in a serious manner, whatever their deflections, whatever the erroneous solutions attempted. And, if for no other reason, this has to be done in order to help those looking for solutions.

Responsibility is a category connected with acts, and with action. Furthermore, it appears as a social, or individual-psychical phenomenon exclusively in situations where there had been some human action or desistance therefrom. Various types of responsibility may be distinguished in connection with particular modes of action or of desistance. We are however interested in only one of them.

If someone, bound by an agreement to act performs his duties in an indifferent manner, or fails to comply with the accepted standards, or does not act at all - he is responsible for the harm resulting therefrom. His responsibility may be financial or penal, and depends upon the nature of the harm done. For instance, an architect of a jerry-built house is liable to civil action unless further harm ensued, wherefor his becomes a penal responsibility. A driver who violated traffic laws is responsible for the violation of administrative regulations, again if no act has been committed, causing the responsibility to become penal. There may be penal responsibility in store for a physician who neglected to perform some intervention. The same applies to a railwayman who neglectfully failed to shut a crossing, and thus brought an accident about.

This, however, is not what we have in mind when referring to moral responsibility. Moral responsibility appears in cases which -- for any reason whatever -- are not subject to legal sanctions even though they are frowned upon by society.

But, also in this connection, not all types of moral responsibility are of interest to us.

For instance, someone refused to see a man who was clearly distressed and desperate. On the same day, that man committed suicide. The society blames the man who refused to see him. The man himself feels remorse even though he is irreproachable under law.

This is a clear example of moral responsibility, however, it is not of interest to us in this connection. In a similar manner, we are not interested in other cases of moral responsibility, connected with acts or with desistance therefrom, and which are not punishable by law, however are undertaken by a man fully conscious of doing something reprobable because of his hopes for a reward, because of cowardice etc. This will be simply a moral misdeed, and denouncing it creates no problem.

We are interested in the situation of a special type which lay at the foundation of the moral indignation felt by entire social groups over the years 1955-1957, and which continues harassing people. We are referring to the matter of moral responsibility for political action undertaken in circumstances of conflict. The problem whether one must denounce a clear moral transgression, consciously committed, was not important to these people then, nor is it now. What both was and continues being important was the question of how to act when there is a conflict between, say, organizational discipline that orders something done, and the recoil experienced by a man who deems such action contrary to his conscience. A great problem, this, and that is why it should be openly discussed, with things being called what they are.

And so, we have to examine a certain special category of situations of moral conflict. This conflict-nature embodies the crux of the problem, and this is what our own 1956-1957 "moralizers" failed to see or understand: Following in the footsteps of existentialism, they overlooked what was truly interesting and creative in the existentialist concept.

Personally, I think we are greatly indebted to the existentialist theory for bringing to light the meaning of conflict situations in life. This discovery of their own, the existentialists used in order to justify their thesis that the individual is alone, isolated, "doomed to choice" etc.

The entire subjectivistic ballast of existentialism is tacked, precisely, onto the conflict situations. However, the manner in which the existentialists used such discovery does not diminish its importance. On the contrary, it should be watched even closer, so that, when the unnecessary impurities have been removed, the real problems may be brought to light.

A situation is one of moral conflict when human action, aimed at objectives positively evaluated under the accepted system of values leads to results the same system of values appraises as negative. The man involved simultaneously feels moral incentives that urge him to act, and others, that stay his hand. This is how moral conflict is born.

It is connected with the complex nature of the situation, with the interwoven desires and interests that cannot be satisfied at one and the same time since they are conflicting interests. Such life situations are most interesting from the theoretical point of view and, unfortunately, they are frequent. I said "unfortunately" because these situations are extremely difficult owing to irreconcilable conflicts embedded in them. They often break a man's heart, and, in extreme cases, bring his life to a violent end.

There are plenty of examples both from strictly private human life, and from lives connected with public affairs. These examples extend to all situations in which a man wants to do well and, in so doing from one point of view, ineluctably causes evil from another. Orestes and Antigona are the symbolic victims of such situations, in which tragic heroes are elementally born.

As we have said, also these matters will be passed under silence. For we are exclusively interested in a certain sector of conflict situations, namely in that of situations connected with our political life of the past few years. Moreover, to discuss these topics in their entirety, a treatise, not an essay would have been necessary. However, I would like to draw attention to one matter of a general nature that will help us in further deliberations.

Throwing light upon conflict situations constitutes a blow dealt moralizing. It affects both the official, religious moralizing which believes that it has solved all the problems through blessing us with the Decalogue and through teaching us that one should not steal or slay but should love one's brethren and do a few additional praiseworthy things -- and the crypto-religious moralizing which conveys to us essentially the

same purport -- absolute orders and prohibitions -- in secular garb. One should clearly realize that wherever absolute moral precepts are preached, they are -- whatever their form -- religious in their essence. The only difference is that the overtly religious position is at least consistent: The norms are heteronomous, imposed by a superior being, and hence eternal and unchangeable, absolute. If one states that such norms are absolute (in the sense of their being eternal and irrefutable) because they flow from a categorical imperative, from human nature etc. he, in fact, states what religion does, namely that they are heteronomous. For only in appearance are they connected with the world of men; human nature, innate imperative etc. etc. are of an unknown or, at any rate, extra-human origin, they appeal to a mystical "spirit," "human nature" etc. They have nothing in common with the exclusively real human world -- that of human society, as ex definitione they are not its creation. Here, the absence of a Creator is a clear and awkward inconsistency.

Moralizing of this description is reduced to bankruptcy when confronted with situations of conflict. The panacea of moral precepts shows itself to be helpless when the objective collision occurs between the modes of such precepts being applied. The problem but starts where moralizing considers its work to have been completed through the utterance of sacramental do's and don't's. It so happens that compliance with an order has the simultaneous breach of the very same order for its correlate. The problem does not consist of obeying moral orders and prohibitions but of selecting some alternative application of either of these under circumstances in which every choice is wrong. Therefore, one must choose what is better, what causes lesser evil. But how to choose? What norms to apply? And here moralizing, both religious and secular, remains silent. Both teach: "Thou shalt not kill," but both fail to foresee a situation in which compliance with this prohibition with regard to one person has for its consequence its breach -- even though one's part be indirect -- with regard to another person, and possibly to many other people. For instance, when, obeying the absolute prohibition, one will not kill a traitor and will thus send one's fellow-underground fighters to their death. That is the problem. It is easy to preach absolute norms. But it is difficult to solve the real conflicts of life. And moralizing that lets one down precisely when reality begins is not worth much. Slender is the value of moralizing, calculated exclusively to "convert" thieves, bandits etc., and absolutely useless in cases of honest men who want to be told how to live with dignity when the situation compels them -- against their will and intentions -- to do something evil. Therefore, the sacred moralizing zeal which at a certain period got hold of some among our "ideologists" clearly led them astray, and obscured the actual, essential issues. If all one can do in a complex life situation is to repeat that morality comes before politics, one gives oneself a certificate of mental poverty: De facto, one fails to say anything that might help the action. For the problem does not begin before the moment when one wishes to decide what is moral, and how to choose in an alternative conflict situation. We will now give all our attention to precisely this problem:

Let us start by a concrete example. Of course, I select an example that, far from being indifferent, has actually pervaded a determined social group for a number of years. I think this is the only way, i.e. by taking the proverbial bull squarely by the horns, that one may gain actual results, and open a dialogue that brings people closer to Marxism. Thus: What is the moral conflict in a situation in which, on the one hand, one is by organizational discipline bound to do a certain thing or things while, on the other hand, one feels one's own recoil, or even is convinced that such act, his duty, is wrong.

Organizational discipline is not a formal, outward matter. It is discipline flowing from the community of aims and endeavors of a certain group of people one has joined out of one's own free will, endorsing its program. Inside such group, organizational discipline is a condition and warranty of the success of the battle joined by the group, since a political organization is a militant association. Thus, the discipline is one's own discipline, and one accepted it on joining the group which politically continues to be one's own group, one's own organization. Evidently, this is a *conditio sine qua non*: Otherwise, all the matter constitutes a misunderstanding and there is no conflict -- one will simply obey the orders of such discipline (we do not consider here the cases of moral cheating which consists in making other people believe this or that by means of one's formal adherence to a group for purposes of some personal advantage). If however one actually belongs to a group, the matter of discipline is of utmost importance to one since it decides the success in the battle one has joined in. One knows a militant group is like an army: Should every soldier consider himself to be the commander, entitled to issue orders, the army would perish, devoured by anarchy, its battle lost in advance. Therefore, to oppose organizational discipline is to weaken the group's prowess. Does one have sufficient reasons therefor? Do not one's hesitations, not shared by so many honest and sensible people flow from a subjective error, from want of discernment and experience? Therefore, shouldn't one march in the same ranks in spite of hesitations and repulse, putting unity above everything else? For one is morally responsible for such unity being maintained.

But, on the other hand, one is gnawed by fear lest the action be wrong that is expected of one, or that one is expected to approve. And wrong precisely from the point of view of purposes dear to one, and which had made one join the group. Let us say such action may compromise the aims of the group in the eyes of the masses, or split its forces, or deprave its ranks etc. One thinks about it as a member of the group, and from the point of view of the group's interests. One feels morally responsible for such, by no means unlikely, consequences. If one feels hesitant only, this means one is unsure of one's position to the very end, as otherwise one would have decidedly opposed such action.

However, what to do, what should one do when amidst an acute moral conflict? If the organizational discipline prevails over conscience, it means that, continuing to own up to moral responsibility for the unity of the fighting ranks, one simultaneously throws down the responsibility for

the consequences of the concrete action. If one takes the opposite course, then as the price to be paid for the consistency of action with regard to the case involved, one must sacrifice the purpose, moral as well, and perhaps vastly more important. Here, the conflict is objective, the choice -- hard.

All this, of course, has nothing in common with the stand taken by our "moralizers". Whoever simply preached: "Morality comes before politics," saw no moral conflict involved since he assumed politics to be chemically pure of morality, and so there was no moral problem to be considered, connected with organizational discipline. But this way of thinking and speaking is accessible only to a man alien to the group, to a man to whom neither the group nor its discipline are his own. This could have been a temporary stand, it could have been a consequence of a political upheaval but that is the way it was.

However, I am referring to a different situation, namely to one in which a man, connected with a group, belonging to it not formally alone but in fact as well lives through a genuine moral conflict: He must choose under conditions in which remaining true to one value is contingent upon losing another one. So what should a man do who lives through such conflict and who is thus confronted with the problem of choice and or moral responsibility connected therewith? What should the factors be, deciding his choice? Can he be helped, and how?

As a rule, when deciding one's choice in such situations, one applies a loss-and-profit balance sheet, and decides upon the more advantageous conditions. The point is to have a suitable system or set of values, and a working yardstick for purposes of comparison. In this case, one has both. But nobody will supply general prescriptions because: First, situations change, and one can only refer to them in a concrete manner and, second, the concrete nature of a situation also depends upon the way a particular person feels about it, and so upon a subjective factor. Therefore, one may not make categorical and absolute statements concerning such matters. One must take the whole of the concrete conditions into consideration.

In final analysis, the decision -- as in any case of choice -- is made by the particular individual. Nobody can do it in his stead. However, the individual can be helped when told the arguments for and against, and explained why the adviser would have acted in such situation one way and not the other.

This does not free anyone of the need for choosing or of moral responsibility for the choice made. However, it constitutes genuine help, and this throws some more light upon the existentialist interpretation of man's "aloneness." In a certain sense, the individual is, no doubt, alone: He must choose, and nobody may take his place either in this or with regard to the act of responsibility. This brings hard experiences about, often breakdowns and, sometimes, when the individual is unable to cope with his own inner conflict -- even disaster. But the "aloneness" and "being doomed to choose" as understood by the existentialists have little in common with what happens in real life. If only because -- as we have said

already -- the individual always remains within a circle of personal sets of values and of patterns that are social by their very nature; because in consulting his conscience at the moment of choice, he is subject to argumentation, also social by its nature. Thus, in this sense, the individual is not left to himself, alone.

However, going back to our subject, i.e. to the matter of choice and of responsibility for such choice, the individual lives through a conflict against the background of a clash between the duty to act (following his feeling of discipline) and the resistance to be offered such actions (following his subjective feeling to the effect that such action is wrong) -- one may only sum up by saying no more than that: There are no general, universally recognized solutions to the problem. The "moralizing" solution which preaches that morality is always to be given precedence over politics consists in a deep misunderstanding of the essence of such conflict, in which the feeling of moral responsibility is present in both clashing sides. Furthermore, such solution may only be advocated by people who are not solidary with the fighting group, who placed themselves outside it. When however one considers people who are living through such inner conflict inside the group, without leaving the organization, in their unchanged capacity as actual, and not formal, members, then one can only advise them concretely to consider each conflict on the merits of the particular role played by the fighting group's unity and of its solidary desire to attain its aims. This piece of advice contains the presumption, moral as well, that in cases of doubt the interest of the group unity takes precedence, and so personal repulse must be stifled in favor of a *sui generis* reason of State. But this is only a presumption, and not the definitive solution to the case. The decision belongs to the individual, and to him alone. If after a careful and penetrating analysis of the entire situation, taking into consideration all the arguments in favor of discipline and of precedence of collective reason one becomes subjectively certain that the action is wrong and harmful, and apt to jeopardize the fundamental aims of the group -- moral responsibility orders him to break with the group with regard to such concrete case, and to act in harmony with one's own conscience. Here, the individual is, in fact, "Doomed to choose," and the past period's experiences show that neither public opinion nor that of the group free one of moral responsibility (even though it be universally known that an individual acted in a certain way not for the sake of his personal advantage but because he believed this was necessary for that of group solidarity).

To illustrate my point, I would like to use a concrete example, particularly convincing for a reader within my field of vision, and which at the same time can show the problem with particular clarity -- an example of a creative scientist, artist etc.

The conflict that may here arise, and that actually often used to arise, is one between discipline and search for truth. Very frequently, this case is passed under silence as if it were something embarrassing. This is wrong. The matter is perfectly human; standing on Marxist ground, one can best show that it would have been superhuman indeed had such

situations failed to arise. They can only be ruled out on the grounds of the cult of an infallible individual, and this, incidentally, is deeply at odds with Marxism which, in the words of its own creator advocated specific methodical scepticism: *De omnibus dubitandum est*. Among other things, the newness of the situation consists in the fact that the policy of such cult had been denounced through disclosing its harmful results and its nature, alien to Marxism. The penetration by these ideas of the soul of intelligentsia, and of our own intelligentsia in particular was the deeper, the deeper had been in the past the violations of the absolutely right idea of predominance of scientific or artistic truth over any other. Therefore, one neither can nor should pass the matter under silence.

This is even more true due to the fact that there neither is a conflict between politics and search for truth, nor can there be, if politics is conducted from a Marxist position. A conflict is both possible and does happen many a time between the truth and the bad, erroneous politics and the organizational discipline expressing it. But erroneous politics is not the same as politics in general. And the correct Marxist politics is *ex definitione* bound to truth and to the struggle for truth because it is bound to the striving for the progress of mankind. Therefore this is the way the creative individual must consider the problem of the politics-truth conflict, when his research does not leave room for doubt that he did find the truth. This is precisely what moral responsibility orders him to do, even when such truth has yet to be universally recognized. For what would have happened to progress and to new ideas in science and in the arts if universally accepted ideas alone had been entitled to recognition? History of science and of culture tells us that we would have bogged down in a progress-destroying stalemate and dogmatism.

The beautiful, philosophically profound drama "The Life of Galileo" by Brecht closes on a shattering soliloquy by its hero. The old scientist, morally tormented by his own cowardice refuses to shake his disciple's hand. And the disciple is ready to change his negative opinion of his Master who, after all, in spite of persecution and of all its dangers, succeeded in completing his scientifically revolutionary *Discorsi*, and in concealing them from the Inquisition. Galileo is more severe in his own appraisal, and his final words contain the quintessence of what we have just been saying. Therefore, we will use his words to close our own cogitations, for it would have been hard to find a more sublime and beautiful expression of their principal idea:

"Even a wool-merchant must be concerned about the possibility of being free to deal in wool in addition to trying to buy it low and to sell it high. It seems to me that science's rights in this connection demand exceptional valor. Science deals in knowledge which is acquired through doubt. In supplying everyone with knowledge of everything, science strives to have everyone start doubting...My own opportunity as a scientist has been quite exceptional. In my time, astronomy reached the market place.

Under these, quite exceptional circumstances, the consistency of just one man standing alone could have shaken the world...I betrayed my profession. Whoever acts as I have done cannot be tolerated in the ranks of science"

(To be Continued).

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Figures on U. S. and U. S. S. R. Armed Forces

United States armed forces were reduced from 12,124,000 in World War II to 1,445,910 in 1948. For many years, the USSR concealed the size of its armed forces, but in January, 1960, Khrushchev disclosed that Soviet forces in 1948 had numbered 2,874,000 -- roughly twice the U.S. figure for that year. In his speech, Khrushchev indicated that this was the post-war low-point for the Soviet forces, saying that from that time an increase was necessary to meet the growing forces of NATO and other alliances. But the U.S. forces in June 1950 (before the United States became involved in the Korean war) numbered 1,459,000, an increase over 1948 of only 13,090. The Korean War, launched by a Communist attack, * sent the U.S. forces total to 3,685,000, but in 1955 this was back down to 2,935,079, and in 1958 the total was 2,598,870. Khrushchev's speech showed that the Soviet total for 1955 was 5,763,000 -- again roughly twice the U.S. total for that year, although the USSR had not sent any forces to Korea. He proudly announced that Soviet forces had been reduced to a 1960 figure of 3,623,000, and that it was planned "to reduce our armed forces by another 1,200,000," bringing it to "2,423,000." But U.S. forces had already been reduced to 2,489,000 for 1960. Khrushchev's figures probably did not include internal troops, border troops, and so forth, numbering around 350,000 which have no American counter-part, aside from a tiny Coast Guard of about 30,000. (Not a single railroad bridge or tunnel in the United States is under armed guard. There are no fences, towers, ditches, plowed strips, watchdogs, etc., between the U.S. and Canada -- in fact, in some areas it is hard to tell when one has crossed the frontier.)

* The fact that the North and not the South Koreans (as Moscow then claimed) were the aggressors was plainly shown by the initial successes of the North Koreans. Like the Nazis on 22 June 1941, they were obviously the side which had its forces poised on the border, ready to spring.

MOSCOW'S PLANS FOR THE FUTURE OF WESTERN EUROPE

First the "Democratic People's Revolution," then "Sovietization". The new party textbook reveals the recipe.

People in the West like to cite a few ancient phrases from Lenin when it is a question of exposing the Kremlin's intention to bring about world revolution. In the following article, Wolfgang Leonhard shows that this is unnecessary: more clearly than Lenin ever did, the present Soviet leaders have publicized their intentions in the new party manual, Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism. Last year this textbook reached in the Soviet Union a publication figure of roughly one million copies; meanwhile it has also been published -- first East German edition, 500,000 copies -- in the other countries of the Eastern Bloc. How does the Kremlin intend to achieve a Communist revolution in the Western countries? How does it envisage the post-revolutionary development? Here are the answers, given by Moscow's leaders themselves.

In the era of Stalin and even in the first years after Stalin's death, Moscow gave only hints of its conception of how the future victory of communism would take shape in the western industrial countries. Now the new official party manual not only describes the expected revolution in Western Europe and the U.S.A., but also sets forth what will happen in Western Europe after the victory of revolution.

In the Soviet view, the present western system of "state-monopoly capitalism" is characterized by a whole series of political and social contradictions. These find their expression in the following six political and social movements:

1. The struggle of the workers for their social and political rights and for the "nationalization of monopoly capital property."
2. The struggle of the peasants "against feudal landlord suppression," as well as against "repression and exploitation by the capitalist monopolies."
3. The "humanistic movement of the intelligentsia" against "the decline of civilization" and the "flooding of western countries with the worse products of American literature."
4. The struggle against the limitation of democratic freedoms and for the defense of democracy.
5. The struggle against the danger of war.
6. The struggle for the protection of national sovereignty.

These manifestations, the Soviets believe, will become stronger and stronger, and will increasingly merge together. Alongside the workers, peasants and intellectuals, certain business circles (in the textbook, "the clear-minded representatives of the bourgeoisie") join in, so that in the end "the majority of the nation" in the capitalist countries is included. The Soviet textbook sees in the creation of such a united "anti-monopoly and anti-imperialist Front" the point of departure for further evolution toward communism.

Guidelines for Overthrow

The Moscow textbook teaches further that, at a certain definite moment, these popular movements will be transformed into revolution. A "revolutionary situation" arises -- according to the Soviet textbook -- when "the policy of the

ruling circles has gone bankrupt and entered a cul de sac, when discontent grows among the masses, and confusion reigns at 'top levels'. "Economic factors such as unemployment, inflation, and over-production may lead to this, as well as political factors -- for example, an unrestrained political reaction, increasing threat of war, a resurrection of Fascism, or "the danger that the country in question will be drawn into the catastrophe of an atomic war." Only a "revolutionary situation" creates the possibility that the popular manifestations can be "merged together into a democratic revolution." In another place, reference is made to the "democratic people's revolution" in which the broadest strata of the people take part. "Whether and to what extent such revolutions will be realized by force or by peaceful means depends, according to the Soviet textbooks, on the conditions and power relationships in the particular country at the particular time. In any case, they would bring about the fall of the existing government and the formation of a "coalition of democratic forces."

"The overthrow of the dictatorship of the capitalist monopolies by a democratic revolution will lead to the elimination of the agents of the big monopolies from power and to the transfer of power to the hands of the people; in other words, it will lead to a coalition of democratic forces, to which the working classes, all levels of the peasantry, the middle levels of the urban population and the democratic intelligentsia can belong. This means that the main forces of reaction will be isolated and, in the very first, democratic stage, overthrown."

The term "agents of the big imperialist monopolies," means, of course, all significant forces and persons opposed to the development desired by Moscow. On the other hand by "coalition of democratic forces," the Soviet textbook means the CP officials and all persons who are ready to work with the Moscow-directed CPs in such a government.

Interestingly, it is stressed that the new people's power is supposed -- wherever possible -- to use the parliament as "its form of organization and its weapon in the struggle against the rule of the monopolies." In this way the new power -- as is stated with amazing frankness -- will acquire "immediately the necessary authority, which will ease the ensuing socialist transformation." In these circumstances any resistance against socialist overthrow becomes illegal, not only de facto but also de jure, and is directed against the will of the people, which finds its expression in the parliament. "In any event, at the same time the "revolutionary people's movement outside parliament" will have to be strengthened, in order "to achieve the social transformations by parliamentary means."

So much, then, for the description of the path to the establishment of the "coalition of democratic forces" -- that is, pro-Soviet governments. In the Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism, however, it is also reported -- again with astonishing openness -- what these new governments are to do next.

The division of large landed estates is described in a relatively brief way; the description of the taking over of industry by the state is given in more detail. At first, only the big trusts and corporations will be nationalized. Nevertheless, in "the lands of highly developed capitalism" this will lead, even in the first stage of revolution, to "the establishment of a strong state sector in the national economy, to which 60 to 80 percent of the industrial plants belong." Thus a stable foundation for the transition to socialism" will be established right at the start."

The smaller property owners will at first be spared. "In the countries of developed capitalism, the interests of the small stockholders will doubtless be respected in the nationalization of the big capitalist industrial enterprises. This holds also for those who receive small annuities, insurance benefits, and the like." The textbook also promises not to expropriate the businessmen in those drastic ways used after the revolution in Russia. Rather, cooperation will be sought "with the part of the bourgeoisie which is ready to accept the socialist transformation."

But how does this look in practice? Mixed companies with state and private participation are to be formed. The transformation can also be eased by the following means: "the capitalists can, over a certain period, be paid definite amounts for the property handed over." Finally, their moral position will be alleviated as follows: "the state uses their experience and knowledge" and assigns "them to appropriate positions in the plants." But this will happen only if "the bourgeoisie loyally supports the new order." Otherwise, "the bourgeoisie will draw down upon itself repressive measures from the state."

True to the "Soviet example," the agriculture of the countries of western Europe is supposed in the future to be collectivized. At the same time the textbook asks that consideration be given to leaving in existence "mechanized farms and large capitalist agricultural enterprises." A future collectivization in the highly developed countries will "contribute much that is new to the forms and methods of cooperative amalgamation."

The further industrial development in the future communist countries of western Europe will also be easier, because they will not need "to completely develop all branches of industry themselves," but instead will be able to limit themselves to those branches of industry "for which they possess favorable natural and economic conditions, and which are more suited to their national tradition and their experience in production." In all countries "which under capitalism have already reached a high stage of industrial development, "it is no longer a question of developing industry; instead "the economic relationships created and the disproportions inherited from the past overcome."

These formulations say nothing other than that the countries in western Europe coming under Communist control would have to adapt their economics to that of the Soviet Union.

A Complete Timetable

Thus there is in fact a Soviet timetable for western Europe. Hitherto much reference has been made in the West to quotations from Lenin from the years 1918 and 1919 in demonstrating the dangerous aims of Soviet communism. These methods never seem to me very convincing, because the Lenin quotations stem from a completely different period, and also for the most part have not been used in Soviet publications for years. Today these materials are certainly no longer necessary: the new Moscow textbook Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism has revealed the goals of the Kremlin much more clearly than any previous publication.

The timetable is clear: opposition movements in the West are to be exploited and amalgamated according to Moscow's wishes. In the "revolutionary situation" which is thereby created, the "anti-monopolistic people's revolution" will (so Moscow hopes) become a reality which will replace existing governments with a "coalition of democratic forces." The authority of parliament will be used to facilitate social changes. All further measures will then be carried out on the Soviet model, although in a somewhat more cautious way. Finally, the future economic structure in the countries of Western Europe will be reorganized and made to fit in with the system existing in the Soviet Union. All this is supposed to be achieved without war, without the force of arms--by "peaceful" pathways, by political methods.

To all those who still regard the Soviet Union and its international aims as primarily a military problem, the new textbook Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism is urgently recommended. Moscow's longrange goals for Western Europe are clearly formulated there--in a book which has already been distributed in over a million copies. It depends on us to find the right answer. The purely military answer can never suffice. It is much more a question of strengthening, in the western countries, that sea-wall on which alone the world revolutionary wave of communism can break, the sea-wall which is built up with community resolution and with a community organization which is completely serious about freedom, justice, and the value of man.